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Subjectivities configured as post-human may challenge investments in former 
configurations of what it means to be human, but there remains enough of a residue of 
‘the human’ for culture to persist in defining the non-human, or specifically non-humans. 
If it is conceived by what remains of culture as human, sexuality implies an involvement 
with the human. Whether it is within or between entities or as ubiquitous dissipative force 
sexuality effectuates alterations in patterns of subjectivity through desire, pleasure, sexual 
events and affects. Ethically this definition impels the need to theorise those who don’t 
count. Corpses provide an ambivalent point within the human/nonhuman issue as they are 
both and neither human/nonhuman – the were that do and don’t count. The corpse is the 
actual material residue of ‘the human’. Necrophilic desire is located around this 
involvement. Even the discrepancy in describing desire for corpses or for the corpse 
raises issues of necrophilia being a generic sexuality – the necrophile – or a specific 
dialectic – desire for a corpse invested with particular individual qualities or memories of 
those qualities. ‘Non/Human’ invokes machines, animals, epistemes, powers, inanimate 
objects. Corpses share everything with humans except life, so the non-human element in 
necrophilia is the absence of life rather than genus or organic alterity. Animation, rot and 
other material differences follow. This chapter explores the navigations of the human 
raised when the corpse – human non-human and simultaneously non-human human – 
enters into a desiring pattern with a living force tactically described as human. 
 
Transgressive sexuality has frequently been defined through the dominant paradigms 
which it transgresses. This means transgressive sexuality is often seen as either affirming 
these paradigms by being oriented in dialectic opposition to them, or politically 
challenging in reference to them. Perversion is, however, the multiplicity at the very heart 
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of desire that dissipates and redistributes the body’s intensities. ‘Normal’ sexuality is one 
reiteration of these corporeal libidinal cartographies – reiterative because reliability in 
repetition is a key feature of normal sexuality’s nature and power. Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari’s claim that all desire affords a becoming means that transgression1 is 
already within all forms of desire. Theirs is a project of queering desire, rather than 
reifying any one form of sexuality as queer. This article will explore the queerness of one 
seemingly heterosexual desire – male/female sexual situations – as it is incarnated in 
necrophilia. Deleuze and Guattari, together and separately, as well as Foucault, all 
critique the term ‘transgression’. Transgression is unable to exist independently as a 
haeccity. It can only be measured against and in reference to, while a Deleuzio-
Guattarian reading is an interrogation of the different parameters, paradigms and plateaus 
within rather than against systems, an alteration of trajectories and velocities. Perhaps a 
more correct term would be ‘lines of flight’, however I use the term transgression here 
because necrophilic trajectories have been truncated and reified through a variety of 
institutions and thus have a particular relationship with these institutions. The use of the 
term is, however, brief and tactical, and is only relevant while necrophilia’s relationship 
with these institutes is being discussed and reactive rather than active affect is maintained 
in the analyses. 
 
Non-aggressive examples of necrophilia in three films, Beyond the Darkness (Aristede 
Massaccesi, Italy, 1979), Macabre (Lamberto Bava, Italy, 1981) and Flesh for 
Frankenstein (Antonio Margheriti, Italy, 1973), which include both male and female 
corpses, emphasise the ways in which necrophilic desire requires a destratification of the 
body into a Body without Organs. Accidentally but nonetheless relevant, these three films 
have all been banned, thus conflating the transgressive nature of their content and the act 
of viewing them – another point at which the residue of the problematic notion of 
transgression arises. Forensics describes the ruptured body in death as ‘dishevelled’. 
Organs become genital, surgery sexual and the striation of the gendered body is 
dishevelled through the planes of pleasure2 offered by the corpse. Necrophilia is 
configured into dialectic and onanistic practice, confusing subject and object, desire and 
disgust. These corpses are physically bodies with organs, but entirely reorganised, as is 
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the desire of the necrophiles. When Deleuze and Guattari ask us to sing with our rectum, 
here we see those who fuck with their entrails, launching on becoming-viscera. Reading 
the body through gender signifiers of genitals is no longer relevant in these ‘heterosexual’ 
relationships. The larger structure of necrophilia in society will not form a major part of 
the essay. However recent changes to the laws in the US punish necrophilia as ‘immoral’ 
while vindicating institutionalised homophobia and misogyny seen in laws such as the 
homosexual panic law, and the low incidence of prosecution for rape. ‘Perverse’ 
sexualities, from homosexuality and necrophilia to celibacy and lust-murder are morally 
maligned as equivalent based on the ways all challenge ‘proper’ object choice. But non-
violent perverse sexualities pose challenges to issues of corporeal volition and desire 
beyond traditional oppositional and hierarchical libidinal configurations.  
 
In September 2004 Governor of California Arnold Schwarzenegger created California’s 
first law forbidding necrophilia as a criminal act. The felony is punishable by up to 8 
years incarceration. In March 2005 the media went into a frenzy over the 2001 study in 
which natural science documented the first observation of necrophilia in Mallard ducks – 
homosexual necrophilia at that. (see Moeliker) In 1973 Baron Frankenstein announced 
‘to know death, you have to fuck life in the gall bladder.’ 
 
Perhaps it is difficult to define necrophilia as a dividuated sexual act at all. Primarily one 
must select the paradigm by which the corpse is defined. Item of respect? Fetish item? 
Forensic text? Victim of aggression in order to procure a corpse for a sex act? Object of 
nostalgia? Past tense person, present tense property? Meat? Flesh? What can one do with 
a corpse? Is traditional sex with a corpse queer? If, according to Monique Wittig, 
sexuality creates gender through opposition, is necrophilia still either heterosexual or 
homosexual? Is a corpse gendered if it is no longer a person? Is visceral necrophilia, 
using the entrails for pleasure, different to ‘straight’ necrophilia sex acts? Is this kind of 
necrophilia a form of surgical fetishism? What gender is a gall bladder? Guattari sees the 
repressive regime of signification as perpetrating a massacre of desire and the body. Can 
massacring the body – opening it out, cutting it up post mortem and achieving pleasure 
from it – end the massacre of the body? He states: 
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We can no longer sit idly by as others steal our mouths, our anuses, our genitals, our 
nerves, our guts, our arteries. In order to fashion parts and works in an ignoble 
mechanism of production which links capital, exploitation and the family. We can no 
longer allow others to turn our mucous membranes, our skin, all our sensitive areas 
into occupied territory – territory controlled and regimented by others, to which we are 
forbidden access… We can no longer allow others to repress our fucking, control our 
shit, our saliva, our energies, all in conformity with the prescriptions of the law and its 
carefully defined little transgressions. We want to see frigid, imprisoned, mortified 
bodies exploded to bits, even if capitalism continues to demand that they be kept in 
check at the expense of our living bodies. (Guattari, 1996: 32) 
 
In this article I am going to explore de-signified corporeally massacred bodies, in relation 
to the sealed, facialised and genitalled body which is complicit with the massacre 
capitalist and Oedipal systems perform on the body and desire. The reason I have 
selected necrophilia in particular is not because it offers a privileged version of queer but 
because in death the body can be actually, physically reorganised – massacre not as 
murder but as physical eruption. The first part of this article will contextualise the ways 
in which necrophilia is a form of sexuality emergent through legal and medical discourse 
rather than volitional desire. The second part offers an exploration, through three Italian 
horror films which exemplify necrophilia in different ways as reorganising the flesh and 
desire. The torn apart corpse as object of desire and the relation between two enfleshed 
entities are open systems of connexion rather than dialectic between two organised 
bodies. The fleshes open out toward each other, one actually, the other in libidinal planes 
which disorganise the body Guattari points out is massacred through systems of 
signifying the body and desire relations.  
 
Necrophilia and Discursive Massacres 
 
‘I shall not even take into consideration those [perverts] who are condemned by a judge 
to choose between prison or psychiatric treatment’ – Francoise Péraldi: 170 
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Before I elaborate my arguments lauding the pleasures and perversions of necrophilia in 
certain films as examples of Deleuze and Guattari’s body without organs, of Deleuze’s 
Leibnizian fold and of Guattari’s massacred body, I want to dispel any association of the 
forms of necrophilia upon which I will focus with traditional associations of necrophilia 
with (often violent) criminality. This section is, tediously but I think necessarily, about 
what this essay is not. At the very least, what the need for the following shows is that the 
‘sexuality’ of necrophilia is, like all sexualities, not a singular, predictable or repeatable 
form of sexuality.  
 
The case which resulted in Schwarzenegger outlawing necrophilia was initially charged 
as a break and enter into the morgue, because the law did not know how to prosecute 
necrophilia and had to charge the perpetrator with something (the moral outrage toward 
the act was intensified by what was perceived to be paedophilic necrophilia – the ‘victim’ 
was 4 years old.) Corpse defilement is frequently charged as wilful destruction of 
property. This conforms with a Kantian perspective, which would position the corpse as 
property and thus the violation of which is an ethical consideration between a person and 
the property rather than the subjectivity of another. Does this new law invest the cadaver 
with volition, thus in necrophilia the corpse is a victim of rape against its ‘will’? If so the 
perverse (but not necessarily aggressive) sexuality of necrophilia and violent crime 
become mutually exclusive.  Many films and clinical texts associate necrophilia with a 
precluding violent act perpetrated in order to procure the corpse. The criminal and the 
pervert are closely aligned, both share a relationship with clinical epistemology – the 
criminologist, the psychologist and in the case of the corpse itself the forensic 
pathologist. The modern serial killer is often made more interesting by focussing on their 
necrophiliac tendencies – Ed Gein, Ted Bundy, Jeffrey Dahmer and Dennis Nielsen. The 
role of psychiatrist and criminologist coalesce in the seminal 1906 work of Krafft-Ebing, 
the Psychopathia Sexualis. Lustmurder sits side by side with necrophilia. Case 24: 
Ardisson, is not simply a necrophiliac, in spite of being classified under this heading. He 
also drinks urine, eats rats and cats, as well as his own sperm, is paedophilic and 
apparently olfactorily retarded – the fact he finds the stench of putrefaction inoffensive 
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seems galling to Ebing. Happily Ebing tells us Ardisson was ‘pleased with prison life.’ 
(40) Ebing’s other case of necrophilia, Case 23: Sergeant Bertrand, despite being of 
‘delicate physical constitution’ (37), killed animals to procure entrails. His necrophilia 
did not focus on sex with corpses but onanistic activity with entrails, thus he was named a 
monomaniac. While all monomania is based on the demarcation of a single-minded, 
obsessive and dividuated libidinal practice, and thus necrophilia itself is technically a 
monomania, Bertrand’s focus on viscera, which is not a single object nor subjectivised, 
rather than a past-tense person-corpse, seems to change the inflection of the monomania 
beyond a perverse dialectic of subject/object. In spite of bestiality necrophilia, Bertrand’s 
perversion with human bodies was entirely heterosexual as sex with male corpses ‘was 
always attended with a feeling of disgust.’ (38)  It is not mentioned whether the animals 
were male or female. Unlike Ardisson he was sentenced to one year court-marshal. Ebing 
ends this case with the observation ‘The actual motive for exhuming the bodies however, 
was then, as before, to cut them up; and the enjoyment in doing so was greater than in 
using the bodies sexually. The latter act had always been nothing more than an episode of 
the principal one, and had never quieted his desires; for which reason he had later on 
always mutilated the body.’ (39) This last comment could as easily describe a forensic 
pathologist as a viscera-focussed necrophiliac. The relationship is contingent with the 
use-function of the corpse in relation to ‘pleasure’. The sexual psychopath ‘uses’ the 
corpse differently to the scientist. The former is a necrophiliac, the latter perhaps an 
epistophiliac.  
 
The corpse is territorialized by forensic medicine and religious ideology. Capitalism 
allows the corpse to be ‘used’ by forensic pathology, making the ultimate object of 
uselessness work, while making invisible the scientist who uses it. Pfohl and Gordon’s 
description of criminology makes an interesting connection with the forensic pathologist. 
They describe the clinical formation of the criminal subject: ‘Erect before the bar he sees 
her as grave matter to be ordered knowledgeably. His deadly nature and her law he rights, 
he writes, he rites – three rights and nothing left: the right of man, the writings of a 
science and the ritual construction of an empirical order... the pleasure of criminology is 
to displace the other’s unfixed pleasure’ (230) Various incarnations of psychology exert a 
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similar power in their creation of the pathological pervert. But both perform a textual 
practice equivalent to the making-textual the matter of the corpse. Pfohl and Gordon’s 
cadaverial euphemisms are apt. The criminologist is deadly to pleasure by righting and 
writing it, seeing unbound pleasure as grave and placing it in its grave by classifying it 
within existing taxonomies of perversion. Pfohl and Gordon continue their forensic 
euphemisms in describing the practices of the taxonomist of pathologies:  
 
The second pleasure of criminology involves his gaze. To keep an eye on her, to 
classify, count and cut her up; to make her visible as a certain thing; to dissect that 
visibility into rates and measure her incidents; to map her determined figure and to 
analyze her probable path; to uncover everything about her and to lay her bare; to 
arrest her so that he may operate upon her and see what happens. (230)  
 
Massacring the self by expressing desire with a massacred body leads to a concept 
prevalent in psychological and medical theories of perversion, which is the supposed 
intrinsic inclusion of aggression and hatred towards the perverse object choice. In his 
book Perversion: The Erotic Form of Hatred Robert J. Stoller posits the argument that all 
perversion is borne of hatred towards the object choice, or what the object choice 
represents. By taking it as a sexual ‘partner’ the object which is hated is mastered in order 
to surpass a moment of trauma from the past. The perverse act is given an origin and thus 
a reason. He states  
 
In order to begin to judge these ideas, draw on your own experience. Think of 
perversions with which you are familiar... In each is found - in gross form or hidden 
but essential in fantasy - hostility, revenge, triumph, and a dehumanized object. Before 
even scratching the surface we can see that someone harming someone else is a main 
feature in most of these conditions. (9) 
 
Before annihilation of a human, dehumanisation must ask the question ‘What is human?’ 
and inevitably deconstruct the relationship between what is human and the subject. What 
is human is not opposed to what is not human but what is not a being at all, what is not an 
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integrated object is placed in opposition to the human or a subject. Wholeness is implicit 
in what is human, and the crisis of transforming, shattering or changing subjectivity is 
adamantly indicative of something not whole and not one. For this reason 
dehumanisation should not be taken in a derogatory context. Only when the aim of de-
humanisation is to affirm and reify the perpetrator’s own humanity does the act of 
dehumanisation raise issues of hierarchy and power. Through perversion the condition of 
being human, with the limits and boundaries of perception of self and object this entails, 
is negotiated so that the self can no longer look at itself and its partner and say ‘I am 
human’. Rather, at a loss for language, the self shifts towards a depth beneath the (or one) 
surface, with a different ‘feeling of self’ and hence, ‘feeling of object’.3 Stoller quotes 
1930s perversion theorist E. Straus, ‘ “the delight in perversions is caused by... the 
destruction, humiliation, desecration, the deformation of the perverse individual himself 
and of his partner.”(Straus’s italics).’ (In Stoller, 8) These ambiguities are further 
problematised when the object is itself a frontier between humanity (is a corpse human?), 
temporality (it was, what is it now?), ideologies of respect and disgust.  Stoller chooses 
this quote despite the tacking on at its end of ‘and of his partner’. Beyond the question as 
to whether a corpse counts as a partner, as a ‘someone’, the destruction of the self rather 
than the partner is more pertinent to my discussion though less so for Stoller. Stoller says 
nothing of the italicizing by Straus of ‘deformation’. ‘Desecration’ (so frequently 
suffixed by ‘of the grave’) and ‘destruction’ are words that evoke the massacre of body 
and self. But destroy and deform are ideal words to describe becoming otherwise; here, to 
elucidate the ‘something different’ the necrosexually changing body is becoming, the 
massacred, destroyed, deformed body(ies) and intensities of proximity and connexion 
with an actually massacred body. 
 
To stay with the subject-object dialectic for a moment, the necrophiliac is positioned 
toward a deeply confounding ‘object’. Devoid of will, what is a corpse? Is it symbolic of 
a purely abstract memory, or an actual memorial object? What if the corpse is that of a 
dead lover? Does this mean that the necrophiliac is expressing a form of fidelity beyond 
the call of duty? When the sealed corpse becomes dishevelled flesh through opening up, 
is it a different kind of object of desire? Does Bertrand’s adamant heterosexuality show 
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that the corpse always remained gendered? If so how are the entrails gendered? I evoke 
these questions not to answer them, and certainly neither to vindicate nor derogate 
necrophilia, but to offer the corpse as a materialised version of a conceptual as well as 
actually massacred body. I am however adamantly not going to analyse cinematic 
representation of necrophilia when it is associated with crime because I wish to focus on 
necrophilia as part of a non-aggressive, non-violent massacre of the body. Criminal 
aggressive necrophilia reiterates traditional power paradigms of perpetrator/victim, often 
in murder incarnated as male/female.  The compulsion to read necrophilia within this 
dynamic occurs before the instance of necrophilia. The corpse is, etymologically the most 
immediate definition of the expression ‘a body’. But what it is in relation to humanity and 
materiality is volatile and dynamic before the necrophiliac is positioned in relation to it. I 
have used the expressions ‘conceptually’ and ‘materially’ neither as opposed nor as 
extricable. Guattari and Deleuze and Guattari’s bodies without organs and becomings 
show the materiality of thought and the structuration of desire and flesh as epistemic. The 
materiality of the corpse is emphasised here because the corpse is so material – 
stinkingly, rottingly, traumatically and viscerally so, actualising new layers of the flesh 
when thorax is opened and fluid extravasated. The corpse is subjectivity as only matter 
and the ultimate symbol of humanity as nothing more than flesh, but flesh which is 
unknowable, whose pleasures evoke infinite possibility not available in a living body. 
The body represents both the most mundane and most frightening point of ideals and 
anxieties of the indivisibility of subjectivity, flesh, discourse, desire and pleasure. 
 
In connecting epistemic with aesthetic systems (or symptoms), the following section will 
introduce a selected range of studies of necrophilia in academia, popular culture and film 
to introduce established structures of necrophilia which I will not deal with. These are 
selective simply to offer a range of examples, as this essay is not a study of 
representations of necrophilia, but uses specific texts to explore necrophilia differently. 
Primarily, and at this stage rudimentarily, three ubiquitous aspects of these examples of 
necrophilia are challenged and alternatives offered through the work of Deleuze and 
Guattari. These are: the retention of a dialectic structure between object and subject, 
associated with fetishism, and particularly psychoanalysis; the maintenance of 
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subjectivity within the corpse through the striated body, where the organs (particularly 
the genitals) retain their biological and metaphoric signification: the necessary 
association of necrophilia with criminality and explicitly (usually misogynistic) violence 
and aggression. Elisabeth Bronfen’s Over Her Dead Body deals with the objectification 
of the dead woman in art, poetry and literature. By affirming the gender of the corpse the 
title suggests the non-consent aspect of necrophilia. Lisa Downing’s Desiring the Dead, a 
psychoanalytic study of French literature, critiques studies which ‘focus somewhat 
erroneously on what the necrophile does, and are obsessed with the acts that appear most 
obvious – sexual intercourse.’ (3) Against this, Downing emphasises ‘the choice of the 
corpse as subject matter.’ (30) Downing and Bronfen both retain the sexual dialectic as 
positioning subject and object, and sexuality as predetermined act. For me, the materially 
de-subjectified corpse emphasises the affective space between the two – ‘Between the 
two there is threshold’ (Deleuze and Guattari: 250)  
 
Aggressive violence, necrophilia as violation and frequently misogynistic act is perhaps 
the most prevalent representation of the desire. Contradictorily however, while gory 
necrophilia is met with outrage (including gory lyrics) violent but clean deaths seem to 
conform with stereotypes of necrophilia and are responded to with less verve. Films such 
as NekRomantik (Jorg Buttgereit, West Germany, 1987), The Necro-Files (Matt Jaissle, 
US, 1997), August Underground (Fred Vogel, US, 2001) and Lucker the Necrophagous 
(Johan Vandewoestijne, Belgium, 1986) offer cinematic representations of clinical 
associations between criminality, murder and necrophilia, with greater or lesser degrees 
of complexity. In death metal Slayer’s 213 emphasises the control the necrophiliac can 
exert over the most docile subject-object: Complete control of a prize possession, and the 
relationship between memory and necrophilia: Memories keep love alive/ Memories will 
never die. Less nuanced, explicitly aggressive lyrics can be seen in Cannibal Corpse’s 
Necropedophile, where paedophilia, necrophilia and naughty swear words emphasise the 
act extravasated from desire at all, simply offered as something to shock by hitting 
sanctified lines of social values. Like The Necro-Files the songs of Cannibal Corpse are 
more infantile and affirm the paradigms they cross rather than exemplify new forms of 
subjectivity, pleasure and desire. Without the maintenance of the subjectivity of the 
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corpse and society’s systems of morality the pleasure and point of these acts cease to 
exist. They seem to respond to the predicted reaction, so that the act itself seem at best 
purely symbolic and at its extreme completely circumnavigated. What is important is not 
what is done, but what is seen (or heard) to be done.4 
 
Nacho Cerdà’s Aftermath (Spain, 1994) and I’ll Bury You Tomorrow (Alan Rowe-Kelly, 
US, 2002) continue traditional urban apocrypha of the sexual habits of morgue workers, 
which, strangely, never seem to be associated with forensic pathologists, only their 
discursive (and presumably economic) inferiors. Kissed (Lynne Stopkewich, Canada, 
1996) is a more mainstream example of necrophilia in film. Kissed needed to be branded 
‘art’ in order to vindicate the practice of the female necrophile, affirming two stereotypes 
– that women’s sexuality is more delicate and less violent, and that only when necrophilia 
is filmed in an arty way can it offer anything more than offensive aggression to planes of 
desire. Even in popular understandings of cultural ‘phenomena’, such as AIDS, 
necrophilia is evoked. Tim Dean’s Beyond Sexuality associates necrophilia with the death 
drive but also, fascinatingly, as a safe sex option. Where there is no longer a risk of AIDS 
from a person – traditionally minoritarians such as homosexual men and drug addicts but 
increasingly third world populations – the corpse as ‘waste’ threatens disease from its 
unsanitary condition and its seduction of the mentally invaded psychopath. Dean states: 
‘Think of the symbolic order as a net settling over the corporeal form… the process does 
not happen in a uniform way because there is no single symbolic order that we all 
inhabit’. (197) Through a variety of epistemic structures necrophilia is foxed at every 
turn, a virus of psychiatry or nosology or even addiction as 213 expresses: Physical 
pleasures an addictive thrill/ An object of perverted reality. 
 
In the Folds of the Flesh 
 
By way of connection, all of the following films I will discuss have been banned by Film 
and Literature Classification Boards around the world, in spite of not being aggressively 
violent. The viewer is then positioned as part of the taxonomy of criminals, a pervert for 
procuring illegal films, for enjoying these films and in the most simplistic argument, 
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repeating what they watch in the real world. I wish to suggest that in order for the 
necrophile (this term is now used tactically, not to refer to a pathologised pervert ‘type’) 
to enter into a desiring intensity with the corpse, the subject/ object opposition must shift. 
The corpse neither fails to nor fulfils entering into the spaces between subject and object. 
The corpse isn’t a symbol of the abject because the corpse – not spoken of, but 
immanently encountered – is the event which cannot be deferred to a second order 
signification. The corpse opens out self, flesh, desire and pleasure as it is opened out. 
Foucault states: ‘One sees how in certain instances… the misuse of sexual pleasure might 
lead to death.’ (133) Death of what? Does misusing the corpse offer a way out of 
subjectivity, a petite mort not through orgasm but de-subjectification? Necrophilia’s 
visceral pleasures is not subject and object in opposition, but pleasure in folding with the 
planes of flesh of the object – beyond metaphors of flesh and fold necrophilia signifies 
every part of the flesh, every nerve (no longer nerve because no longer perceptive), every 
tissue mass, every artery, every organ, the unfolded skin as libidinally provocative. In the 
event of necrophilia skin may be peeled, entrails fondled, parts removed or moved 
around, corporeal minutia explored and every plane of the body reorganized into a new 
configuration with new function and meaning. The films I will discuss offer three forms 
of corporeal massacre. In Macabro the female necrophile has only a head lover, in 
Beyond the Darkness the dead lover is enjoyed through tender acts of taxidermy, and the 
entrails are used as libidinal objects, sorrowful reminders and ecstasy inducing aspects of 
the lover. The exploitation of entrails only available in necrophilia reaches its zenith in 
Flesh for Frankenstein where the viscera are the primary site of sexual obsession. The 
corpse is at once all sexual and signifying of nothing in particular. Because its 
rearrangement is limitless the corpse asks its lover not why, but what can it do and what 
can be done with it. What the corpse can ‘do’ refers to affect rather than action. This 
means the possibilities of affect fold the corpse as active entity with the necrophile in 
her/his open-ness to being affected and create new affect possibilities within the corpse 
through experimentation with the limitlessness of the corpse. The necrophiliac must be 
passive, as they forsake activity based on significations of sexual narratives and signified 
flesh. The necrophiliac is passive in the face of the vertiginous loss of self that occurs 
with loss of opposition and signification. No longer ‘I am, it is, hence I will desire it in 
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accordance with the sexuality appropriate to object and subject’ but ‘how can I desire, 
how is this matter before me desirable, what can I do with it, what does it do to me, what 
connexions do we enter into?’ The corpse is all at once past-tense person, infinitely 
experimental matter, flesh which both resonates with living flesh and is a fleshy 
something else altogether unique to the corpse.  The films I have chosen to look at in the 
following sections are horror films, however none are particularly violent beyond the 
‘violence’ or violation of the corpse. The protagonists are not driven by aggressive 
impulses and the points of intensification in the films occur not in procuring death, with 
which many horror films are concerned, but with what affects can be elicited post-
mortem. Each film is different in terms of its necrophilia, in conformance with my point 
above that the only constant of necrophilia is the presence of a corpse – sexuality, the use 
of the body and the relations of phantasy and memory with it are not guaranteed. While 
some horror films dealing with necrophilia are described as gothic – films of Edgar Allen 
Poe stories for example – because they deal with memory and the uncanny resonances 
between the corpse and a lover, the films I will look at I describe as baroque. These films 
are all made by Roman directors. They come from a genealogy beginning with Gian 
Lorenzo Bernini rather than the British history of the gothic novel or the uncanny 
nostalgia of Poe. Thus geographically, historically and visually like baroque sculpture 
they continue artistic and philosophical expressions based on the flesh, unfolded and 
refolded, what Deleuze calls the ‘pleats of matter’. While ghosts and memories haunt the 
suggested necrophilia of British gothic, baroque necrophilia does not mourn the dead 
subject. It exploits the present materialisation of the lover, indulging in the new 
possibilities the flesh offers. The new flesh is explored rather than the old flesh 
memorialised. It exchanges mourning for ecstasy. Deleuze states of the baroque: 
 
Why is the requirement of having a body sometimes based on the principle of 
passivity, in obscurity and confusion, but at others on our activity, on clarity and 
distinction…. Microperceptions or representatives of the world are those little folds 
that unravel in every direction, folds in folds, over folds, following folds… and these 
are minute, obscure, confused perceptions that make up our macroperceptions. (86)   
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Through Leibniz, Deleuze sees the body as a necessary limit, both the site of passive 
possibility and required resistance. The body, a body, one’s body, is according to 
Deleuze, the deduction of affects and microperceptions, self as coalescent active acted 
upon expression rather than induction of subjectified body into world. Traditionally we 
are inducted into systems of pre-signified bodies and sexualities. There is no necessary 
opposition between the macro-self and the self as unfolding and folded in upon series of 
microperceptions. The necrophiliac exploits the actually unravelled and limitlessly 
unravell-able flesh, but requires the macroperceptive self to open up, to become passive 
in the presence of an object of desire that demands imagination, possibility and a 
relinquishment of the macroperception of ‘lover’ as an organised distinct entity which 
acts upon the self. The affective qualities of the corpse come not from its will but through 
folding with the necrophiliac. Desire, viscerality, possibility of act and dissipation of 
pleasures are pleats which configure the fold of subject and object differently at every 
turn. Self is fuelled by obscured desire in front of an obscure-able object. Through each 
act and wave of intensity another fold of self is pleated – ‘a fearsome involution calling 
us toward unheard of becomings.’ (Deleuze and Guattari: 240)   
 
The decision to act is not borne of the act being pre-signified. Signification in medico-
legal discourse comes from a resistance to discursive passivity, where we synthesise into 
being our acts as a series of linguistic habitus which ‘constitutes our habit of living, 
[which ensures us as an] ‘it’ will continue…thereby assuring the perpetuation of our 
case.’ (1994: 74). Pre-signification massacres libidinal expression through inducing the 
necrophiliac into a defined form of sexuality – before the act – rather than a deduction, 
after the act(s), ablating each aspect or element of each example of necrophilia as a 
unique folding of living with dead flesh. Necrosexuality is a form of sexuality not ‘as a 
process of of filiation transmitting the original sin. But… as a power of alliance inspiring 
illicit unions or abdominal lovers. This differs significantly from the first in that it tends 
to prevent procreation.’ (Deleuze and Guattari: 346) Epistemology is transmitted; we 
come into being as a transmission, procreated through discourse.  Folds of necrophilic 
perceptions with the abominable lover include but are in no way reducible to: The 
tactility of entrails; memory of lost love; confrontation with limitless possibilities of the 
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flesh unavailable (without harm) in a living body; a body devoid of former signification 
but significantly desirable; and as I will discuss below, the massacre of gender and sexual 
narratives borne of sexuality as a pre-ordained induction. Opening new folds in the body 
creating new folds of perception ‘opens a rhizomatic realm of possibility effecting the 
potentialisation of the possible, as opposed to arborescent possibility, which marks a 
closure, an impotence.’ (Deleuze and Guattari: 190) Being respected, thus saved from 
defilement, makes the flesh of the corpse impotent. Potentialising the possible comes 
from a certain passivity by the necrophile to different folds, which effectuate new aspects 
of each face of the fold, just as each peeling away of a part of the corpse reorganises it 
into different planes of possible sexual ‘fun’. Necro-folding and unfolding, any 
proliferates pleats of Deleuze’s contemplation: ‘We speak of our “self” only in virtue of 
those thousand little witnesses which contemplate within us; it is always a third party 
who says “me”.’ (Deleuze, 1994: 75) Each aspect of self is a contemplation, its own 
independent element, connected to every other element in contraction, dilation, force, 
non-corresponding receptive and perceptive elements. Contemplation is a turning in of 
self as not what it does but through its active and passive synthesis with its own elemental 
aspects and those of all others, resonant with Lyotard’s libidinal band. Self is neither 
made up of ‘bits’ nor of post-acting contemplation of self as object of study. 
Contemplation is immanent, self as before and within its own relational affects, 
‘contractile contemplation which constitutes the organism itself before it constitutes the 
sensation. (Deleuze: 1994, 79) Contemplation is therefore not perception through deferral 
nor repetition as sameness, but act as always different within itself through the specificity 
of the changes in expectation and contraction at each repetition which necessarily 
changes the elements. Necrosexual acts (actually and contemplatively) de-part bodies and 
sexual acts iterated through perception as reification. The corpse, and the acts of the 
necrophile are intensified examples of passive syntheses because their acts are not laid 
out as traditional sexual acts are, because the body has already been made particles and 
relations destablilised. But then how can we speak of the necrosexual at all? Does this 
example suggest a deferral once again to causality, both saying there is difference in even 
the most asinine sexual acts, and that using necrosexuality as exemplary re-fetishises and 
reify it as ‘different’? I suggest that necrosexuality as representing a social and cultural 
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limit forms an assemblage, a fold, a passive synthesis (all different but all ways of the 
necrophile’s contemplation) as an abstract line of flight, belonging to the realm of the 
imperceptible: ‘There is no doubt that an assemblage never contains a causal 
infrastructure. It does have, however, and to the highest degree, an abstract line of 
creative or specific causality… this line can be effectuated only in connection with 
general causalities of another nature, but is in no way explained by them.’ 
Necrosexuality, the bodies involuted and undone, create a larval sexuality – immature 
and transformed at every synthesis, which acts not toward a thing but toward its 
metamorphosis, toward perceiving itself which cannot be perceived, toward the 
imperceptibility within repetition where all elements within syntheses are dissipated, 
disoriented and reoriented with each turn, each folding and each alteration in the aspects 
of involution. (Deleuze and Guattari: 283) ‘The self does not undergo a modification, the 
self is a modification.’ (Deleuze, 1994: 79) 
 
Preliminary Dishevellment – Getting Head 
 
Lamberto Bava’s Macabre (Italy, 1980) is the story of Jane Baker (Bernice Stegers) who, 
as a result of a car accident in which her lover is decapitated, keeps his head in the freezer 
(it is never made clear if the keeping of the head only is due to the pragmatics of having a 
small freezer). The revelation of Jane’s cranio-necrophilia comes at the end of the film, 
after ninety minutes of hearing Jane talking to the head, screaming in passion during their 
sexual encounters and generally acting as if she is living with her (rather silent) lover. 
This is all perceived through her blind lodger Robert (Stanko Molnar), and like he, we 
remain blind to the actual relationship until the films final scenes. Jane’s necrophilia is an 
interesting starting point in my discussion as it offers an example of the female 
necrophile with a male corpse (or part thereof). Stereotypically the corpse is usually 
female and the necrophiliac male, be he scientist, poet (such as Poe) or artist. Jane’s 
necrophilia does conform to a certain type of necrophilia, that of nostalgia for a lost love. 
What is emphasised is that this love is not a substitute for the hope of an imminent new 
lover, nor a tragic memorial fetish. Jane seems authentically happy with her head lover. 
We do not know what she does with it, but, extricated from genitals, its gender becomes 
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rather confounding. What is the relationship between a head and gender? Is Jane still 
hetero, even if we read the possible sexual acts she can perform traditionally – 
cunnilingus, kissing? How is her body signified without genital alterity? For Deleuze and 
Guattari the face is the primary site of signifiance of subjectivity, the place where the 
organised body quickens all significations into one intensified point of textual 
transcribability. The face will tell us what race, gender, age and even class the rest of the 
body is without the need to see its entire form. ‘It is precisely because the face depends 
on an abstract machine that it is not content to cover the head , but touches all other parts 
of the body… The question then becomes what circumstances trigger the machine that 
produces the face and facialisation.’ (Deleuze and Guattari: 170) Through being 
territorialised by the face, the whole body becomes face. The flesh conforms to the face 
and the gender of the face will establish patterns of possible sexual paradigms for the 
body – female face equals female genitals. Against another female face the female face is 
lesbian, against a male face heterosexual. Gender is found in the face and assures the 
genitals, which in these paradigms are taken as the primary and ‘appropriate’ site of sex. 
When it comes to established sexuality, getting head is getting face. Non-intercourse sex 
relies on the affirmation of the presumed genitals of the lover even if they are not naked. 
All non-genital sex is risky because it shows the body as divested of gender. (I do not 
include the anus as a genital here because it is not necessarily gendered unless its 
especially privileged proximity to the genitals is seen or felt.) A mouth is a mouth, but a 
straight person probably won’t want a same-sex mouth near their body. Genitals are 
territorialised and territorialising of the body when emergent through a binary machine. 
When the head is extricated from the torso does the face maintain its territorialisation of 
the entire body – ‘the head is included in the body but the face is not’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari: 170)? The de-facialised head alone cannot signify genitals – is a genital free 
body still a gendered body? If so in the same way? The abstraction of signifiance as pre-
formed rather than formed at the encounter of each body as unique event is both arbitrary 
and redundant when a head is all there is. Jane’s head-lover can be taken as an example 
of Deleuze and Guattari’s body-head system, liberated from the facialising machine… 
and the body. Jane’s head lover is not a partial body object however. When the head is 
extricated from the facial territorialisation of the body, any single part no longer defers 
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meaning to the whole. Each part can maintain its signification only to a certain extent. 
While a disembodied genital may still signify gender and thus sexuality, an arm or heart 
has only limited potential to do so. They may signify something else, but libidinally their 
meaning is unclear. Each part has a unique relationship to its former full body organism 
signification, but remains signified nonetheless. So how can a part deterritorialise 
subjectification and thus sexual paradigms, including gender, act and desire? ‘The 
question of the body is not one of partial objects but differential speeds.’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari: 172). Whether or not Jane thinks she is heterosexual, the fact remains she can’t 
be heterosexual in any way familiar to her former sexuality. This isn’t ‘me and my head’, 
because the proximity between Jane and her head is what causes others to eventually ship 
her off to the asylum. For each relation and connection between her lover and herself 
there must be a compensation or exploration to negotiate the new structure. Even if her 
sexuality is memorial heterosexual, sexual acts with her head-lover are rhizomatic – 
‘short term memory or anti-memory. The rhizome operates by variation, expansion, 
conquest, capture, offshoots…a map that is always detachable, connectable, reversible, 
modifiable and has multiple entryways and exists and its own lines of flight.’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari: 21) The memory of heterosexual intercourse cannot help Jane as it is no 
longer an option. That she doesn’t seem particularly perturbed by the failure of this 
memory suggests hers is a happy rhizomatic sexuality(ies). 
Beyond the Darkness, into the Body of Light 
‘At each stage of the problem what needs to be done is not to compare two organs but to 
place elements or materials in a relation that uproots the organ from its specificity, 
making it become “with” the other organ.’ (Deleuze and Guattari: 259) Francesco 
(Kieran Canter) is a taxidermist. His girlfriend Anna (Cinzia Monreale) dies after 
Francesco’s housekeeper Iris (Franca Stoppi) places a curse upon her. Francesco is not 
particularly saddened by his loss, he does not cry, instead he disinters Anna, preserves 
her and places her at his side in his bed. Aristede Massaccesi’s Beyond the Darkness 
(Italy, 1979) has been criticised as offensively gory for the scene of Francesco preserving 
Anna. The scene plays in loving close up unflinchingly and includes extraction of entrails 
and eyes, and body fluid extravasation and preservation. While I find the scene 
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fascinating rather than offensive or shocking, I will presume that upon first viewing there 
is an element of surprise and perhaps squeamishness evoked in the viewer. When 
Francesco removes Anna’s heart, he bites into it ecstatically. Clearly the traditional 
signification of the heart as site of love is evident here. Does eating the heart of a corpse 
maintain this signification? When we take a metaphor as an actual, does the metaphoric 
signification stand, or is it colonised by the actual? If the metaphoric without the actual 
were present, there would be no disgust at the scene. This scene offers an interesting 
involution of the organisation of the organs of the organism. Francesco clearly indulges 
his appetite for the love of his girlfriend by eating her heart (if I were to stretch the act 
into a transcribable sex act I would say cunnilingually). He is also eating a heart in a 
situation of love. The scene is extreme and gory because the heart fails to remain a 
metaphor only. Emphasising Deleuze and Guattari’s notion that the Body without Organs 
is not a body devoid of organs but organisation, I would argue that internal organs, in 
their resistance to use for pleasure and evocation of disgust, create Bodies without Organs 
by their very being as organ. By using an actual organ a desiring connexion ‘with’ other 
organs is created. The inside of the body, the internal organs, lose their metaphoric 
signification when the thorax is opened, in autopsy or medical imaging, because they 
become the property of medicine not desire. Is the organ the same organ when it is a 
physiological, anatomical organ, not a metaphoric organ? The organised body is 
organised differently depending on which system of signification it emerges through. 
This is emphasised when entrails are presented, as they belong predominantly if not 
exclusively to medical rather than sexual systems. The signification of genitals resonates 
with their metaphoric signification – the ‘passive’ egg, the ‘active’ sperm, the ‘empty’ 
vulva, the ‘rigid, forceful’ penis are also adjectives relatively appropriate for metaphoric 
ways of feminising or masculinising other attributes, qualities or objects. This is why 
Deleuze and Guattari resist tails in becoming-dog because they are phallic. Entrails fail to 
translate their conceptual into their physiological attributes so readily. The same organ – 
the heart – is two different organs, in two incarnations, with two functions in the two 
systems of medicine and poetic metaphor. Incommensurable double signification leads to 
the massacre of this heart. The heart is therefore not ‘the’ heart but ‘this’ heart, a heart 
that confounds and conflates the visceral with the metaphoric. The heart which Francesco 
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bites into may represent Anna’s heart to him, but it does not to the viewer or there would 
be no sense of horror. Is a heart ‘feminine’? Perhaps, but he shows no interest in her 
breasts or genitals, he doesn’t even have sex with her later in the film, so what precisely 
this heart evokes libidinally in Francesco is volatile. His mouth is site of ingestion and 
outward projected expression through kissing. To ‘kiss’ a heart would be more 
acceptable, albeit relatively gruesome. The relation Francesco makes between ingesting 
mouth and no-longer-metaphoric organ creates the new line of desire, the line of viewer 
and the line of flight.  
In death as in life, the interiors of the body seem more ‘organ’ than external organs such 
as the genitals, the nose or the skin. His mouth-to-heart act forms what Deleuze and 
Guattari call an unnatural participation. Against traditional metaphors of organs of love, 
Francesco removes Anna’s eyes because eyes rot. Eyes are often associated with love, 
with a connection to the soul, with an interface between mind and world. We gaze into 
our lover’s eyes; they express emotions associated with love – joy, sadness, and in pupil 
dilation sexual excitement. In death the soul supposedly leaves the body. So presumably 
the eyes can leave the body also. Yet there is something especially harrowing about eye 
extraction. Taking Anna’s eyes seems to be the last frontier in acknowledging that her 
‘self’ is no longer present in this flesh. Because of the associations between eyes and 
love(rs) this scene seems incommensurable with Francesco’s interest in the heart as 
purely symbolic of love. If it were such, surely the eyes would also be privileged for their 
equivalent metaphoric status? Like Macabre’s Jane, Francesco is not delusional in that he 
is not unaware of the necessary practicalities of having such a lover, prone as they are to 
decomposition. In spite of their functional purpose, the use of surgical tools in the scene, 
and tools of embalming, adds a surgical fetishism to the connection between Anna and 
Francesco. While I do not have room here to go into the particulars of surgical fetishism 
it is another form of ‘perverse’ sexuality which would be interesting to analyze in a 
Deleuzio-Guattarian context. Surgical ‘fetishism’ is somewhat of a misnomer, as it does 
not deal with psychoanalytic fetishism but with forming new and different connections 
between bodies, organs and tools. Surgical fetishism is more like Deleuze and Guattari’s 
masochism in that it is understood psychoanalytically and clinically in a different way to 
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reading it as a becoming Body without Organs. While the films of Cronenberg, 
particularly Dead Ringers (Canada, 1988) would seem appropriate examples, the 
uncanny doubling and particularly the use of investigative and explicitly gender specific 
surgical tools in the film to interrogate the female interior prevents the film from really 
challenging psychoanalytic relations of desire. The Mantle twins are compelled to reveal 
an (albeit deformed) plane in the body of women rather than create new folds. Linda Ruth 
Willaim’s celebrates Cronenberg because he unfolds the flesh to reveal. She speaks of 
Cronenbergian narratives and even ‘Cronenbergian identity’ (33). These terms replace 
‘normal’ narratives and subjects with ‘weird’ ones, but singular and structured ones 
nonetheless. A more interesting example of surgical fetishism comes from another 
Antonio Margheriti film, The Virgin of Nuremberg (Italy, 1963). Deformed servant Eric 
(Christopher Lee), former acolyte of a General known only as ‘The Punisher’ (Mirko 
Valentin), polishes daily the surgical tool set belonging to his General. The use of the 
tools is not specified. The relationship between Eric and The Punisher is similarly not 
structured but is adamantly libidinal. The conflation of sex and surgery as practical in 
Beyond the Darkness becomes purely libidinal in my next film for analysis, Flesh for 
Frankenstein. 
Flesh, Fold, Film 
Flesh for Frankenstein (Antonio Margheriti, 1974) is a particularly baroque take on the 
Frankenstein tale. Baron Frankenstein (Udo Kier) creates a master race of ‘zombies’ so 
he can repopulate the world with his perfect and obedient children. Meglomaniacal 
undeniably, but the real interest in the film lies with the incidental propensity of the 
Baron’s extracurricular activities. The Baron is repulsed by copulative sex, but relishes 
the opportunities he is afforded as an anatomist. He fondles the entrails of his female 
zombie (Dalila Delazzaro) until achieving climax, and literally fucks her gall bladder, 
espousing to his Igor-esque servant Otto (Arno Juerging), ‘to know death... you have to 
fuck life... in the gall bladder.’ The Baron’s adept performance raises questions regarding 
the pleasure science affords as an episteme, especially due to its more-intimate-than-
intimate relationship with the various dishevelled plateaus of the flesh. The act of groping 
organs in particular can be nomenclatured as perverse – masturbatory and necrophilic – 
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or it can express a reconfiguration of flesh and sexual dialectics. While the female 
zombie is opened up, the Baron opens up as well, exposing his perversion and, exploiting 
cinematic technique, his climaxing face in extreme close-up. The zombie opens her eyes 
during the act, awakened perhaps by the extraordinary experience, confounding the 
stereotypical aestheticised dead female that populates many Poe-esque horror films. Most 
emphatically, the viewer is opened up, presented sensorially with the force of the body 
unwound like a great visceral ribbon and intelligibly with desire that exceeds hetero, 
homo or pathological.  
 
The Baron breathlessly coos ‘spleen, liver, kidneys, gall bladder...’ It may be argued that 
this is a version of the phallologic desire to name and know the female body in order to 
control it. But entrails are not gendered. This scene is as far from predictable praise in 
sexual scenes for ‘breasts, legs, ass, mouth’– organs that have gendered resonance – as it 
is from a heterosexual act. The Baron exclaims ‘beautiful!’ when he first approaches the 
body, but suffixes this with ‘the incision is superb’, so his concept of corporeal beauty is 
immediately deterritorialising, aesthetic perfection found in a non-contusive suture. There 
is, however, a tension here between the Baron’s naming of the organs and the act’s 
revolutionary potential. Naming risks structuring the pleasure, ‘since instead of being 
passages of abundant intensity, these metamorphoses become metaphors of an impossible 
coupling.’ (Lyotard: 23) The entrails are not metaphors. The Baron presents an 
impossible coupling as possible, and indeed as immanent.  
Why is this apparently confounding and strange scene pleasurable to view? If we cannot 
describe the on-screen pleasure within established sexual systems, how can we describe 
our pleasure at viewing them? Watching the act and the pleasure experienced from 
viewing adamantly continues to resist being reified as a repeatable dialectic of pleasure. 
Thought traditionally, where on-screen flesh and pleasure sets up a demand for a similar 
or simulated version in the viewing flesh, in what ways does our pleasure reflect these 
on-screen bodies and pleasures? As the pleasures of the necrophile involve becoming 
passive to designification, so our pleasure as viewers requires an opening up to the 
images and their intermingled repulsive pleasures and extraordinary bodies. Lyotard’s 
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elaboration of Deleuze and Guattari’s Body without Organs in Libidinal Economy 
emphasises the unraveling of signified flesh with the unraveling evoked in desire. To take 
Lyotard's definition of the flesh literally, the ‘body is undone and its pieces are projected 
across libidinal space, mingling with other pieces in an inextricable patchwork.’ 
(Lyotard: 60) 
Our viewing bodies must be thought differently, stratified in a different pattern, undone 
and re-patched so that we are no longer dependent on genitals and gazing eyes as 
gendering and desiring organs. Viscera and confusion, even repulsion, enter into our 
pleasured viewing bodies. Thus definitions of pleasurable scenarios, bodies and what is 
desirable at all become re-configured. It could be argued, of course, that this 
reconfiguration occurs at every libidinal situation. This scene’s unusual representations of 
desire and flesh perhaps make thinking the reconfigurations all desiring bodies go 
through more immediately accessible, even compulsory. In this instance our relation to 
cinema is an example of Lyotard’s libidinal band, where we ‘open the so-called body and 
spread out all its surfaces’ (1) which, he continues, is made up of the ‘not only…’ where 
nothing, organic, inorganic, minutely refined and dishevelled, grossly baunastic, forms 
desire as pleated, twisting membrane, one great ephemeral skin. The particular desiring 
membrane of screen and viewer I call the cinesexual – the unique desiring relation 
between film and spectator. ‘Cinesexuality is the launch upon a line of desire where the 
outcome cannot be known – desire for a shadow, an inflection of light, quality of frame 
or contrast. The layers of expectation, pleasure and satisfaction are redistributed in the act 
of watching and so our desire must also redistribute. [Horror film], eliciting a turbulence 
of visceral reaction, a rhythmic refrain between viewing flesh and the speed of the film, 
may be an intersection at where our attraction and corporeal dispersion connect with the 
viewed.’ (MacCormack, 2001) There is a risk in passivity to cinema, emphasized at the 
visceral response to which horror film is met. The viewer, like the cadaver on the table, is 
eviscerated into splanchnic proliferations.  ‘Cinesexuality requires all viewers to come to 
cinema with an openness to the pure possible. Spectators ‘gift’ themselves to the 
indeterminability of affects and breaks in signifying systems. Submitting oneself to film 
is submitting to affects that indulge in the breaking down of logic and the flesh itself… 
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Cinesexuality is expressed not in what one watches but how one is altered.’ 
(MacCormack 2005: 351, 352)   
What is the Baron’s desire? Why do we watch it with such an intermingling of disgust, 
confusion and pleasure? Traditional desire, her body and our intelligible viewing flesh 
that attempts to make meaning of the image are all undone, coming together in a 
constellation of pleasure, perversion and openness, breaking down the material and 
discursive fissure between viewer and viewed. Remaining in a simple binary of 
ordinary/extraordinary or normal pleasure/perversion positions relies most often on the 
subjugated terms – extraordinary, perversion – being defined not by what they are, but by 
the ways in which they fail the regimental and specific criteria of the dominant terms. For 
example, the opposite of heterosexual is not only homosexual, but also any failure at 
heterosexuality, from bisexuality and heterosexuality that includes effeminate 
masculinity, to small fetishes and grand panic narratives such as paedophilia. But 
between the cracks and fissures of these epistemological pathologies are found an infinite 
amount of minor and major transgressions of the rigid parameters of normalcy. 
The more confounding the perversion, the greater the resistance to it being reduced into a 
conceptual list of symptoms and reasons for these. Our pleasure at the Baron’s perversion 
is difficult to fix into an established perversion that includes the perversions on-screen 
and our pleasure at watching them, as well as our horror at our pleasure, and at what the 
Baron is doing and an endless list of further intensities difficult to demarcate and name. 
That we cannot comprehend the Baron’s perversion is essential to the scene’s powers of 
differentiating the spectator from a traditional viewing dialectic. Jacques Rancière points 
out that ‘the response to the false question “Do you understand?” implies the constitution 
of a specific speech scene in which it is a matter of constructing another relationship by 
making the position of the enunciator explicit. The utterance thereby completed then 
finds itself extracted from the speech situation in which it functioned naturally.’ (47) To 
contend that we do not understand without answering that claim resists interrupting the 
visceral pleasure of the scene for a simulacrum of that scene which replaces the material 
and transformative with the discursive and repeatable, where pleasure reflects the 
already-thought instead of relishing the unknowable.  
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Attempting to explain why we take pleasure in the scene inserts us into a taxonomy of 
perversion. The parameters of the perversion then induct our pleasure instead of deducing 
the pleasure of the images, exchanging pleasure for external reasons for enjoying the 
images. The risks and needs to reduce confounding perversions to a series of symptoms 
and reasons preclude knowledge of them. The Baron’s pleasure at the perverse – his taste 
also ranges over consensual incest, anatomo-epistophilia and autoeroticism (as he enjoys 
both the masturbatory pleasure the female zombie affords him, but also his ecstasy at 
dying with a barge pole through his gall bladder) – contrasts with an investigative 
purpose of the audience setting up of specific questions that must be answered, closing 
off rather than splaying the pleasures in the film. ‘Perversion neither defines nor 
demarcates itself. It is the purity of the something-otherwise, available through the most 
radical or the quietest of acts. However act does not guarantee perversion. Nor does will. 
What perversion resonates is the redistribution of self through sensation and perception, a 
transformation of subjectification and signification. Perversion describes a project of risk 
and of hope. It is not a safe or predictable experiment. One of film's great promises is 
impossible worlds, worlds unrealisable in the everyday, which fold us within the 
unperceivable cinema allows us to perceive.’ (MacCormack, 2004)  
Necrophilic Lines of Flight 
 
In this article I have attempted, using a rather contentious form of sexuality, to explore 
the relationship between bodies and signification based on the taking of an object of 
desire which problematises the relationship between the body and being human. The 
immobile corpse can mobilise desire through forging new connexions which exploit the 
ways in which the flesh can be excavated in death. I have purposefully shifted my 
argument from the epistemology of social necrophilia to necrophilia in films because 
films, like bodies, offer uses and activities with the flesh unavailable in the ‘real’ world 
with ‘real’ bodies. Nonetheless these films are explicitly able to affect the viewer into 
thinking – or unthinking – the body differently and the reorientations or challenges in 
reference to gender and sexual act afforded in necrophilia. As the relationship between 
the necrophiliac and the corpse creates a line of flight, so these often harrowing, 
 26
fascinating and baroque images fold with the viewer to affect them and form new 
trajectories of pleasure, both in viewing images and experiencing the body. The 
representations show us a different sexuality not with which we can replace ours, but 
which affects us and our understanding of the purposes and functions of bodies as they 
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1 Deleuze and Guattari, together and separately, as well as Foucault, all critique the term ‘transgression’. 
Transgression is unable to exist independently as a haeccity. It can only be measured against and in 
reference to, while a Deleuzio-Guattarian reading is an interrogation of the different parameters, paradigms 
and plateaus within rather than against systems, an alteration of trajectories and velocities. Perhaps a more 
correct term would be ‘lines of flight’, however I use the term transgression here because Guattari 
explicitly uses it   
2 My use of the word ‘pleasure’ here is tactical. In response to Foucault’s disdain at the word ‘desire’ 
because it evokes a desire ‘for’ (and thus a lack of) Deleuze refuses the word ‘pleasure’. Deleuze claims 
pleasure ‘seems to interrupt the immanent process of desire… the only means for persons or subjects to 
orient themselves in a process that exceeds them.’ (2000: 255) However, if Deleuze can posit a desire 
which lacks nothing, then my use of the term pleasure comes because it evokes a ‘within’ rather than a 
‘toward’, a pure spatial – and hence immanent – form of ecstasy, outside of temporal narratives. Both have 
issues which I do not have time to elaborate here.  
3 Such a feeling of post-humanism has ethical implications for those who were never given the luxury of 
being considered as true human, the marginal and the minoritarian, including women. This is dealt with in 
Judith Butler’s Undoing Gender and the work of Donna Haraway, particularly Primate Visions and 
Simians, Cyborgs and Women. 
4 This should not be taken as symptomatic of metal music or culture in general. For every Cannibal Corpse 
there is a creative, and indeed Deleuzio-Guattarian, example of metal music (seen for example in doom 
metal band Halo’s 1998 album Guattari: From the West Flows Grey Ash and Pestilence. The author also 
published an article on necrophilia with the same ideas and explications as this piece in British metal 
magazine Terrorizer, issue?  
